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ABSTRACT
Detecting and suspending fake accounts (Sybils) in online
social networking (OSN) services protects both OSN op-
erators and OSN users from illegal exploitation. Existing
social-graph-based defense schemes effectively bound the
accepted Sybils to the total number of social connections
between Sybils and non-Sybil users. However, Sybils may
still evade the defenses by soliciting many social connec-
tions to real users. We propose SybilFence, a system that
improves over social-graph-based Sybil defenses to further
thwart Sybils. SybilFence is based on the observation that
even well-maintained fake accounts inevitably receive a sig-
nificant number of user negative feedback, such as the rejec-
tions to their friend requests. Our key idea is to discount the
social edges on users that have received negative feedback,
thereby limiting the impact of Sybils’ social edges. The pre-
liminary simulation results show that our proposal is more
resilient to attacks where fake accounts continuously solicit
social connections over time.
1. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of online social networking (OSN) ser-
vices such as Facebook and LinkedIn has attracted attacks
and exploitation. In particular, OSNs are vulnerable to Sybil
attacks, where attackers create many fake accounts, called
Sybils, to send spam [10], manipulate online voting [17],
crawl users’ personal information [6], etc.
There has been several proposals that leverage the under-
lying social graph to defend against Sybils [7, 8, 17, 18, 20,
21]. The social-graph-based Sybil defenses are proactive ap-
proaches, as Sybils can be uncovered before they interact
with real users. Those proposals have been extensively dis-
cussed in the research community due to their simplicity and
reliability. The social-graph-based Sybil defenses rely on an
assumption that the social edges connecting Sybils and non-
Sybil users, called attack edges, are strictly limited. Most of
them bound the undetectable Sybils, called accepted Sybils,
to the number of attack edges [7, 20], i.e. O(log n) Sybils
per attack edge.
Although social-graph-based Sybil defenses are able to
provide theoretical guarantees on accepted Sybils, the up-
per bound of accepted Sybils still depends on the total num-
ber of attack edges. Therefore, Sybils have the incentive
to solicit for social connections from real users to increase
the attack edges and evade the detection. Furthermore, well-
maintained Sybils can choose to continuously solicit social
edges, at a speed similar to real users. As a result, they may
be able to accumulate many attack edges from promiscuous
real users, who are open to befriending even strangers. With
current social-graph-based Sybil defenses, the fake accounts
behind those well-maintained Sybils are indistinguishable
from non-Sybil users, because this entire set of Sybils has
adequate connectivity to non-Sybil users.
Fortunately, we observe that the attack edges from Sybils
are usually accompanied by the negative feedback from cau-
tious real users, who are resistant to abusive communication.
A negative feedback can be a rejection to a friend request or
a report on receiving unwanted communication. We have
been conducting a study on live fake Facebook accounts in
the wild (§2.1), and find a significant number of negative
feedback (pending friend requests) on well-maintained fake
accounts that are purchased in black market, although those
accounts may manage to connect to real users.
Our understanding of this observation is that the controllers
behind the fake accounts have limited knowledge about the
users’ security awareness. OSN users have varying levels
of security awareness of the potential exploitation from fake
accounts. Promiscuous users have high tolerance of abu-
sive activities and unwanted communication, while cautious
users are more resistant to fake accounts. The controller
cannot distinguish these types of OSN users, and thus can-
not correctly target promiscuous users. As a result, fake ac-
counts are likely to receive negative feedback from a set of
cautious users, although they may be able to interact with
some promiscuous users.
To leverage this observation, we propose SybilFence, which
improves over social-graph-based Sybil defenses by incor-
porating user negative feedback. Our key idea is to dis-
count the social edges on users who have received negative
feedback. By penalizing the social edges that are accompa-
nied by negative feedback, we are able to mitigate the im-
pact of Sybils’ attack edges, and construct a defense graph
with reduced weights on attack edges. In this paper, we
use SybilRank, a state-of-the-art social-graph-based Sybil
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defense scheme [7], as a proof of concept, and adapt it to
the weighted defense graph.
As shown in simulations (§4), with the defense graph,
SybilFence improves over SybilRank by 10%∼20% in term
of the probability of ranking non-Sybil users higher than
Sybils. SybilFence is shown to be more resilient to attacks
where well-maintained Sybils keep soliciting for social con-
nections over time. We conjecture that SybilFence can also
improve other Sybil detection schemes such as SybilLimit
and Sybil tolerance schemes such as Bazaar [16].
2. SYBIL ACTIVITIES AND NEGATIVE
FEEDBACK
At a high level, the user negative feedback must be trig-
gered by abusive activities in OSNs, and reflect the user dis-
trust to the executor of the abuse. In practice, the user neg-
ative feedback includes rejections to friend requests, flags on
inappropriate incoming communication such as spam, phish-
ing, pornography and extreme violence, etc. We observe that
such negative feedback has already existed in OSNs. OSNs
like Facebook have collected and stored such user negative
feedback, although some of them may be currently under-
utilized or ignored by OSN operators. Therefore, we do not
introduce any change to current OSNs’ use model, and our
proposal is completely transparent to users.
We next take the negative feedback triggered by abusively
befriending as an example and demonstrate why the negative
feedback occurs and how the negative feedback associates to
Sybil activities.
2.1 Negative feedback during befriending
Befriending real users is the first step for fake accounts to
infiltrate an OSN after their creation. During this stage, fake
accounts attempt to establish many social connections to real
users. However, aggressively befriending strangers may trig-
ger negative feedback from resistant users. For instance,
a bilateral social connection requires reciprocal agreements
from both users. The negative feedback during befriending
can be a rejected or an ignored friend request.
Study on fake Facebook accounts in black market. To
better understand the rejection to fake accounts’ friend re-
quests in real world, we have been conducting a study on
fake Facebook accounts in black market. The fake accounts
in black market is an example of the well-maintained live
fake accounts in the wild. Those fake accounts are priced
based on the ages, the number of friends, the number of
pictures, etc. According to our purchase experience, a fake
account with 50 ∼ 100 friends costs $2 ∼ $6 at different
vendors. Those fake accounts look real and their friends
also have rich content in profiles, walls, etc. We have pur-
chased accounts from different vendors via Freelancer [2]
and BlackHatWorld [1]. Apart from pictures, emails, secu-
rity Q/A sets, we explicitly require in our purchases that the
accounts should have “>50 real US friends”. The vendors
always ask a relatively long time period to deliver accounts
Figure 1: A sample of purchased accounts.
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Figure 2: Friends and pending friend requests on purchased ac-
counts.
after we order, e.g., one week or one month. Our work is
still in progress for a large-scale study on live fake accounts
in black market.
Fake accounts look real. In this study, we use 12 fake ac-
counts with 837 total friends. Those accounts are purchased
at different vendors. All of them are at least one year old.
Figure 1 is the profile of a sample account. The profile is
crafted as a college student with pictures, and with posts on
the wall. This account has 84 friends and has interacted with
some friends, such as messages and comments.
Fake accounts receive rejections. In Facebook, a pending
request implies a rejection, as Facebook does not provide
the rejection option. Therefore, we examine the pending
friend requests on each account. Facebook does not provide
this statistic to users directly, but provides APIs to access
the pending friend requests. Figure 2 shows the number of
friends and pending requests on each account. As we can
see, although those well-maintained accounts have many so-
cial connections to users that may be real, each of them still
has a significant number of pending requests.
This result also indicates that the friend requests from
those accounts have an acceptance rate >50%. It is reported
that randomly flooding friend requests only yields an accep-
tance rate less than 30% [6, 15]. We speculate that the ven-
dors might exploit some befriending strategies to improve
the acceptance rate, such as sending requests to the friends
of the users that they have already befriended (triadic closure
principle) [6].
Fake accounts can befriend real users. To estimate how
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many real users the fake accounts have befriended, we choose
2 accounts and send a message to each of their friends. In the
message, we inform the friends that the account is fake, sug-
gest them to disconnect the social connection, and send us a
message back if they established the connection by mistake.
As a result, we have sent out the message to 174 friends.
Within 48 hours, we received 6 messages to clarify that the
connection is mistakenly established. Also, we observed a
significant decrease in the friends of the test accounts. In to-
tal, 16 friends out of 174 disconnect the connections to the
fake accounts. This number is a conservative estimation of
the real users that those fake accounts have connected to,
because some real users may have simply ignored our mes-
sages.
2.2 Discussion
Non-manipulability of negative feedback. In our pro-
posal, a user is able to signify a negative feedback only if she
received unwanted communication such as an unexpected
friend request, a spam message, or a spam post on her wall.
This means that a negative feedback can be generated only
if the user has been directly annoyed or harmed. This is
in contrast to the negative ratings in online services such
as YouTube and Flickr, where users are granted to rate ar-
bitrarily based on their preference. In our proposal, a real
user will not receive negative feedback if she never sends
out unwanted communication. We choose to use the abuse-
triggered negative feedback because it is non-manipulable
under collusion. Without the trigger of abusive activities, a
group of malicious users cannot collude to render arbitrarily
negative feedback to a victim.
Why not use negative feedback to directly detect Sybils?
The negative feedback can be used to directly detect Sybils
with machine-learning (ML) techniques. However, ML-based
techniques [19] require extensive calibration efforts due to
the abundance of possible legitimate and malicious behav-
iors in OSNs. More importantly, these approaches are based
on individual user features, and the resulting alarms or alerts
are only applicable to individual users. Therefore, such tech-
niques may miss the Sybils behind the active entrance Sybils
or currently silent entrance Sybils. Instead, SybilFence em-
ploys social-graph-based schemes and considers Sybils as
groups. By aggregating negative feedback, SybilFence is
able to leverage the aggressive behaviors of the entrance
Sybils to uncover a much larger set of Sybils behind them.
3. SYSTEM DESIGN
In the previous section, we discussed what is the user neg-
ative feedback and how would user negative feedback occur.
We now discuss how to incorporate user negative feedback
into social-graph-based Sybil defenses. We first introduce
our system model and threat model.
System model. We model an OSN with two graphs: 1)
the underlying social graph as an undirected graph G+ =
Figure 3: The social graph and the negative feedback graph in
an OSN.
(V,E+), where V is the user set in the OSN, and E+ rep-
resents the social relationships among users; and 2) the neg-
ative feedback graph as a directed graph G− = (V,E−),
where V is the same user set as in G+, E− is the directed
edge set that includes the negative feedback between users.
Given a direction between each pair of users, we consider no
more than one negative feedback edge. Figure 3 shows both
the social graph and the negative feedback graph sharing the
same user set in an OSN. A node v has a social degree of
deg+(v) in G+ and an in-degree of deg−(v) in G−.
Threat model. Malicious users may launch Sybil attacks by
creating many fake accounts. We divide the user set V into
two disjoint subsets: non-Sybil users and Sybils, as shown in
Figure 3. The non-Sybil region is the collection of the non-
Sybil users, and the social edges and negative feedback links
among them. Similarly, we define the Sybil region with re-
spect to the Sybils. We refer to the social edges between the
non-Sybil region and the Sybil region as attack edges. We
refer to the Sybils adjacent to the attack edges as entrance
Sybils, and the other Sybils as latent Sybils.
3.1 Overview
SybilFence aims to improve the social-graph-based Sybil
defenses using the negative feedback. Our observation is
that the Sybils’ attack edges are always accompanied by neg-
ative feedback. If we discount the trustworthiness of the so-
cial edges that come with the negative feedback, we can limit
the impact of the excessive attack edges on well-maintained
entrance Sybils, and enable social-graph-based Sybil defenses
to uncover the Sybils behind them.
SybilFence comprises of two major modules: 1) a neg-
ative feedback combiner, which incorporates the negative
feedback graph into the social graph, and generates a de-
fense graph with discounted social edges on the users that
have received negative feedbacks; and 2) an adopted social-
graph-based defense scheme that detects Sybils on the de-
fense graph with improved accuracy.
3.2 Incorporating negative feedback
The social-graph-based Sybil defenses bound the accepted
Sybil to the number of attack edges [7,20], regardless of how
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much negative feedback that Sybils have received. Sybil-
Fence improves over social-graph-based Sybil defenses by
reducing the impact of attack edge through the collected user
negative feedback. In principle, we aim to build a weighted
defense graph based on the social graph and the negative
feedback graph. We reduce the weights of social edges on
the users that have received negative feedback, such that the
aggregate weight on attack edges is substantially limited.
Defense graph. Our key idea is to discount a user’s so-
cial relationships with the negative feedback that the user
has received. By cancelling out the social edges that come
along with negative feedback from other users, we are able
to mitigate the impact of the entrance Sybils’ attack edges.
We define the net social degree of a node v as net(v) =
deg+(v)−α×deg−(v) (we require net(v) ≥ 0), where the
offset factor α is a positive parameter. A large α indicates a
substantial penalty of an incoming negative feedback edge.
Thus, a node whose social edges accompanied by negative
feedback has a net social degree net(v) smaller than its so-
cial degree deg+(v).
We define the weight of a node v as its net social degree
divided by its social degree: w(v) = net(v)
deg+(v) . The node
weight is essentially the discount rate of a node. With this
definition, a real user that never receives negative feedback
has a weight of value 1, while a user with received nega-
tive feedback is assigned a discounted weight due to the dis-
counted social degree. A node weight can be translated to
the extent to which the node can be trusted.
We derive the weight of a social edge based on the weights
of its adjacent nodes: w(u, v) = min(w(u), w(v)). The
weight of an edge is determined by the lowest weight of its
adjacent nodes. This is because any of the adjacent nodes
that has triggered negative feedback should discount the edge
quality. Therefore, an edge weight is always no more than
1, and low weighted social edges are always adjacent to in-
coming negative feedback links.
Therefore, we can build a weighted and undirected de-
fense graph G = (V,E+, w). We weight each edge (u, v)
with w(u, v) that discounts the quality of social edges. As
compared to the social graph, where every social edge is
treated equally, our defense graph enforces strictly limited
aggregate weight on attack edges using negative feedback.
3.3 Detecting Sybils
In our initial design, we take SybilRank [7] as a proof of
concept, and adapt it to the weighted defense graph. Sybil-
Rank comprises of three steps: trust propagation, trust nor-
malization, and ranking. We adapt SybilRank to use the de-
fense graph as below.
In the first stage, SybilRank propagates trust from the trust
seeds via O(log |V |) power iterations. In each iteration, the
distributed trust on each edge is proportional to the edge
weight. T (i)(v) is the amount of trust on node v in the ith
iteration. We assume that the non-Sybil region part of the
defense graph is well connected after social edges discount-
ing. We empirically validate it with simulations (§4), and
leave a formal study in future work. In the second stage,
SybilRank normalizes the total trust of every node with its
social degree. Since a node’s social degree is always no less
than the aggregate weight of its adjacent edges due to the
discounted edge weights, this normalization further penal-
izes Sybils that are likely to have substantially discounted
social edges. The last stage outputs a ranked list according
to the degree-normalized trust with non-Sybil users on top.
Algorithm Adapted SybilRank(G(V,E+,W ), seedSet S)
Stage I: O(log |V |)-step trust propagation
In initialization, seed trust evenly in trust seeds;
In a step i (0 < i ≤ h, h = O(log|V |)), node u
updates its trust as below:
T (i)(u) =
∑
(u,v)∈E+ T
(i−1)(v) w(u,v)∑
(k,v)∈E+ w(k,v)
Stage II: Normalize node trust by social degree
Tˆu =
T (h)u
deg+(u)
Stage III: Rank users based on their
degree-normalized trust Tˆ
Return ranked list L
4. SIMULATION STUDY
To gain a better understanding on how our initial design
improves the detection accuracy, we evaluate SybilFence in
comparison to the original SybilRank. We simulate user
friend requests on social graphs, and use the request rejec-
tions as negative feedback.
4.1 Simulation setup
We simulate Sybil attacks in four social graphs (Table 1).
The Facebook graph is sampled via the “forest fire” sam-
pling method [14]. The synthetic graph is generated based
on the scale-free model [4]. We connect a Sybil region that
consists of 5,000 Sybils to each social graph. We simulate
the social connections among Sybils by establishing social
edges from each Sybils to another 5 random Sybils upon its
arrival.
Social Nodes Edges Clustering Diameter
Network Coefficient
Facebook 10, 000 40, 013 0.2332 17
ca-AstroPh [3] 18, 772 198, 080 0.3158 14
ca-HepTh [3] 9, 877 25, 985 0.2734 18
Synthetic 10, 000 39, 399 0.0018 7
Table 1: Social graphs used in our simulation.
Similar to [7] and [18], we use the metric the area under
the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve [12] to
compare the quality of the ranking that social-graph-based
schemes use to uncover Sybils. The area under the ROC
curve measures the probability that a Sybil user is ranked
lower than a random non-Sybil user. It ranges from 0 to 1.
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Figure 4: Impact of the offset factor of negative feedback.
4.2 Simulating negative feedback
Users can send friend requests to others. A request ac-
ceptance yields a social edge, while a rejection produces a
negative feedback edge.
Rejections to Sybil users. We simulate the process that the
entrance Sybils solicit social edges from non-Sybil users. In
the Sybil region, we designate 200 nodes as entrance Sybils,
and the rest 4800 nodes as latent Sybils. The entrance Sybils
represent well-maintained fake accounts, which continuously
send friend requests and have lower rejection rates than la-
tent Sybils due to the better maintenance. By default we set
the rejection rate of entrance Sybils by non-Sybil users to
60%, and the rejection rate of latent Sybils to 98%.
Rejections to non-Sybil users. We simulate rejections to
non-Sybil users based on the social graph. In particular,
given a rejection rate to non-Sybil users and the number
of friends that a non-Sybil user has in the social graph, we
can infer the number of rejections on this user. we then add
this number of rejections to the non-Sybil user by randomly
selecting non-friend users and simulating a rejection from
each of them. We set the rejection rate of non-Sybil users
to 1%. We study how SybilFence’s performance varies with
the change of the rejection rates in §4.3.
4.3 Simulation results
We now present the simulation results in the Facebook
graph. The results on other graphs are similar (see Appendix).
Impact of the negative-feedback offset factor. The offset
factor α (§3.2) is a penalty factor to the nodes that have re-
ceived rejections, including both Sybils and non-Sybil users.
To investigate its impact, we vary the value of the penalty
factor from 0 to 4. Since we set the rejection rate of en-
trance Sybils’ requests to 60%, an offset factor of value 23
can leverage the rejections to cancel out the attack edges on
entrance Sybils. However, the entrance Sybils also have so-
cial edges from Sybils. Therefore, a larger offset factor can
yield further improvement. Figure 4 shows that the improve-
ment keep increases until the offset factor reaches a suffi-
cient large value, i.e., 3.0. With this value, SybilFence is
able to cancel out most of the entrance Sybils’ social edges
from both non-Sybil users and Sybils.
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Figure 5: Resilience to the number of requests from entrance
Sybils.
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Figure 6: Detection accuracy as a function of the rejection rate
to the Sybils’ requests.
Resilience to Sybils’ flooding requests. The fake accounts
can solicit social edges by flooding friend requests. As a
result, the attack edges keep increasing. We study the Sybil-
Fence’s resilience to request flooding. We set the offset fac-
tor to 1 and vary the number of requests that each entrance
Sybil sends from 4 to 36. Each latent Sybil is set to send 2 re-
quests to random non-Sybil users. Consequently, the attack
edges increase from ∼500 to ∼3000. Figure 5 shows that
SybilFence has only small performance degradation. In con-
trast, SybilRank’s performance decreases sharply, because
its security guarantee only relies on the number of attack
edges.
Impact of the rejection rate to Sybils’ requests. At a high
level, both SybilFence and social-graph-based schemes rely
on non-Sybil users to defense against Sybils. We investigate
the impact of the rejection rate to Sybils’ requests. In this
simulation, each entrance Sybil sends 25 requests to random
non-Sybil users. We vary the rejection rate to these requests
from 0.5 to 0.95. The number of attack edges decreases
accordingly from ∼2700 to ∼450. An increased rejection
rate to Sybils’ requests improves both SybilFence and Sybil-
Rank as shown in Figure 6, because this further limits the
attack edges and signifies more negative feedback. Sybil-
Fence achieves higher accuracy due to its advantage from
the consideration of negative feedback.
Rejections among non-Sybil users. SybilFence is based
on an assumption that non-Sybil users are less likely to re-
ceive negative back from others than Sybils. We study Sybil-
Fence’s performance with a varying rejection rate to non-
Sybils’ requests. We simulate the rejections among non-
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Figure 7: Detection accuracy as a function of the rejection rate
to non-Sybil users’ requests.
Sybil users as decribed in §4.2. The rejection rate increases
from 0.05 to 0.45. The offset factor is set to 1 and the re-
jection rate to entrance Sybils’ requests is set to 0.4. As
shown in figure 7, the improvement that SybilFence makes
over SybilRank decreases as the rejection rate to non-Sybil
users’ requests increases. This is because more rejections to
non-Sybil bring more penalty to non-Sybil users, and thus
increase the chance that a non-Sybil user ranks low in Sybil-
Fence. SybilFence performs even worse than SybilRank when
the rejection rate to non-Sybil users reaches 0.25. The rea-
son is that beyond this rejection rate, the non-Sybil users
are more likely to get rejections than Sybils. This threshold
is smaller than the entrance Sybils’ rejection rate 0.4, be-
cause the entrance Sybils have 0 rejection rate to establish
social edges among themselves. This results indicate that
SybilFence cannot improves SybilRank if non-Sybil users
are more likely to be rejected. We suspect that this does not
happen in real world, because real users always send friend
requests to acquaintances. We leave a further study to our
future work.
5. RELATED WORK
This work is mainly related to social-graph-based Sybil
defenses [7, 8, 17, 18, 20]. These proposals rely on social
graph properties to distinguish Sybils from non-Sybil users,
i.e., the attack edges are strictly limited. Existing schemes
bound the accepted Sybils to the number of attack edges.
Thus, fake accounts benefit from soliciting social connec-
tions. SybilFence improves over existing Sybil defenses by
leveraging negative feedback from users. It can be used to
further uncover the fake accounts that have obtained social
edges to real users but inevitably received negative feedback
from resistant users.
There have been proposals to propagate distrust in so-
cial graphs [5, 9, 11, 13, 22]. However, those approaches are
proposed as general techniques for social network analysis,
but not targeting Sybil defense. Furthermore, the distrust in
those proposals is not securely defined, which can include
arbitrarily negative information and is not resilient to user
collusion.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The detection of fake accounts in OSNs has been increas-
ingly urgent as both OSN operators and users have been suf-
fering from illegal exploitation. We observe that even well-
maintained fake accounts inevitably receive negative feed-
back from others, as the controllers only have limited knowl-
edge on users’ security awareness. Thus, user negative feed-
back can be used to strengthen existing Sybil defenses. We
propose SybilFence, which incorporates user negative feed-
back into social-graph-based Sybil defenses. Fake accounts
can evade SybilFence only if they can connect to real users,
and meanwhile receive little negative feedback from others.
Therefore, SybilFence advances the Sybil defenses by rais-
ing the cost for Sybils to evade detection.
In future work, we plan to continue our study on the live
fake accounts in black market to further quantify the neg-
ative feedback they receive. With this study, we plan to
complete and extend the our preliminary SybilFence design.
We can then implement the complete SybilFence system and
probably deploy it in real OSNs.
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APPENDIX
Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10 show the simulation re-
sults in the graphs ca-AstroPh and ca-HepTh, and the syn-
thetic graph (Table 1). In these graphs, SybilFence achieves
similar improvement over SybilRank as described in §4.3.
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Figure 8: Simulation results in ca-AstroPh.
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Figure 9: Simulation results in ca-HepTh.
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Figure 10: Simulation results in the synthetic graph.
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